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From the Heterogeneity Problem 
to a Natural-Kind Approach to Pleasure
Antonin Broi
Abstract
The heterogeneity problem, which stems from the alleged difficulty of finding out what all pleasant
experiences  have  in  common,  is  largely  considered  as  a  substantial  issue  in  the  philosophy of
pleasure, one that is usually taken as the starting point for theorizing about the essence of pleasure.
The goal of this paper is to move the focus away from the heterogeneity problem and toward a new
approach to  pleasure.  To do this,  I  first  show that,  although  the  approach  stemming  from the
heterogeneity  problem  –  what  I  call  the  heterogeneity  approach  –  has  led  to  an  interesting
discussion  on the  essence  of  pleasure,  it  has  significant  methodological  problems that  make it
unlikely to make more progress. I thus propose a natural-kind approach to pleasure, which has been
surprisingly  overlooked so far,  and which seeks  to  determine  what,  if  any,  the  natural  kind of
pleasure would consist in. This approach overcomes the obstacles which the heterogeneity approach
is confronted with. It also broadens the investigation of pleasure by enabling the use of a larger
range of methodological tools, thus opening new promising directions for research. 
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Introduction
Pleasant experiences typically include the various experiences associated with having a massage,
reading  a  good  book,  playing  a  video  game,  having  an  orgasm,  etc.  While  it  is  easy  to  give
examples of pleasant experiences, it is notoriously difficult to identify what pleasure consists in.
This question has given rise to a rich philosophical literature in recent years, leading to a variety of
accounts of pleasure. The starting point for this recent philosophical debate has been the so-called
heterogeneity  problem,  according  to  which  the  heterogeneity  of  pleasant  experiences  poses  a
particularly difficult challenge for defining pleasure. While the heterogeneity problem is arguably
the  touchstone  of  the  recent  literature  on  pleasure,  the  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  argue  that  the
discussion that stemmed from it has reached its limits, and to propose a new direction for research
in the philosophy of pleasure, centered around questions about the status of pleasure as a natural
kind.
To do this, I will first introduce the heterogeneity problem, as well as the role it has taken in the
recent literature (Section 1). I will call the  heterogeneity approach the approach to pleasure that
takes  as  a  starting  point  the  heterogeneity  problem.  The heterogeneity  approach has  led  to  an
exploration of a variety of theories about the structure of our pleasant experiences and the essence
of pleasure. However, I will argue that it is unlikely to make more progress: the methodological
tools that it relies on are too precarious (Section 2). To overcome this problem, I propose to reorient
the debate toward a natural-kind approach (Section 3), which seeks to answer the question whether
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pleasure is a natural kind, and, if it is, what it consists in. In doing this, we can avoid the difficulties
faced by the current debate and allow for a convergence between the investigation of pleasure and
that of other mental entities like beliefs, desires or emotions.
1 The Heterogeneity Problem
The philosophy of pleasure is primarily interested in understanding what pleasure is. As it stands,
this is a standard kind of question in philosophy, one that philosophers can ask about many different
things: What is a person? What is justice? What is knowledge? In the case of pleasure, what seems
to be expected from philosophers is to come up with a definition that identifies the essence of
pleasure, i.e. that in virtue of which experiences are pleasant. Different accounts propose different
definitions of pleasure. Why would we think that pleasure has an essence? Well, as all competent
language users arguably know how to use the concepts “pleasure” and “pleasant”, there must be
something which explains why it is so easy to determine whether one’s experience is pleasant or
not. 
Now, in investigating the essence of pleasure we seem to be confronted with the heterogeneity
problem:  when  we  introspect  our  pleasant  experiences,  there  seems to  be  nothing  in  common
between  them.  Pleasant  experiences  appear  to  be  excessively  heterogeneous.  It  is  difficult  to
overstate how important this problem has become in the recent philosophical literature. Virtually
every article published in the last thirty years on pleasure has mentioned it more or less explicitly.1
A non-exhaustive list includes Parfit, 1984; Griffin, 1986; Feldman, 1988; Kagan, 1992; Carson,
2000; Feldman, 2004; Crisp, 2006; Heathwood, 2007; Mason, 2007; Smuts, 2011; Labukt, 2012;
1 The  problem  is  often  taken  to  trace  back  to  Sidgwick’s  justification  of  his  account  of  pleasure  in  terms  of
desirability (Sidgwick 1981, 127).
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Bramble, 2013; Moen, 2013; Aydede, 2014, 2018; Lin, 2018. “Heterogeneity” has progressively
become the standard term to refer to this problem. 
To give a few examples of how philosophers have introduced it, here is how Parfit, who did not
employ the term “heterogeneity”, put it:
Compare the pleasure of satisfying an intensive thirst or lust, listening to music, solving
an intellectual problem, reading a tragedy, and knowing that one’s child is happy. These
various experiences do not contain any distinctive common quality (1984, 492)
In his 1988 article, Feldman aims to address what he calls the “heterogeneity question”, which he
takes to be a problem affecting sensory pleasures only:
One thing to notice about sensory pleasure is its apparent heterogeneity. The man on the
beach enjoys some pleasurable smells as well as some pleasurable feelings of warmth.
Each of these sensations is pleasant,  pleasurable,  'pleasure-giving'.  Some would find
nothing odd in saying that each of these sensations 'is a pleasure'. Nevertheless, from the
strictly phenomenological perspective, they seem to have very little in common. One is
an olfactory sensation – it is the smell of fresh, salty air. The other is an all-over bodily
feeling of warmth. (1988, 60)
To take a more recent example in the literature, here is how Smuts introduces it:
Most philosophers since Sidgwick have thought that the various forms of pleasure differ
experientially  to  such an  extent  that  one  cannot  find  a  common,  distinctive  feeling
among  them.  The  heterogeneity  of  pleasurable  experience  is  thought  to  make  it
something of a mystery as to why we call these things by the same name. This is known
as the heterogeneity problem. (2011, 242)
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In all generality, the heterogeneity problem stems from two conflicting intuitions that we have
about pleasant experiences. First, that they have something in common: after all, they are arguably
all occurrences of pleasure. This is the claim that we postulate when we try to discover the essence
of pleasure. Second, they do not seem to have anything in common when we introspect them, that
is,  they  seem heterogeneous.  Talk  of  heterogeneity  may  be  usefully  reformulated  in  terms  of
similarity and dissimilarity, which are notions more commonly found in the philosophical literature
and which have been subject to more philosophical scrutiny (see Cowling 2017 for a review of
philosophical issues around similarity, or resemblance). This reformulation is rather innocuous: talk
of similarity is often used to clarify that of heterogeneity (as the quotation further below by Smuts
shows). 
The heterogeneity  problem,  as  it  is  usually  introduced in the  literature,  thus  gives  rise  to  a
discussion about the (dis)similarity holding between different pleasant experiences. This seems like
a useful way to initiate the investigation on pleasure. After all, if we want to define, say, the concept
of person, we might start as well with an investigation of the similarities and dissimilarities between
all the entities we consider as persons. The respect in which all these entities are similar is likely to
have  to  do  with  properties  essential  to  personhood.  In  other  words,  what  all  persons  have  in
common is likely to point to the essence of personhood. 
In the case of the heterogeneity problem, as is clear from the quotations above, a specific take on
similarity  is  taken  for  granted:  it  focuses  on  similarity  in  the  phenomenology of  pleasant
experiences, i.e. in what it is like to have a pleasant experience, rather than on other features of
these  experiences  (e.g.  their  relationships  with  other  mental  states).  As a  result,  there  are  two
standard responses to the heterogeneity problem. One is to take it as justifying the move toward an
externalist,  non-phenomenological  conception  of  pleasure.  This  takes  for  granted  that  pleasant
experiences do not have anything internal in common, and proposes instead that pleasure has to be
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defined in terms of extrinsic properties of experiences, usually the property of being the object of a
certain attitude from the subject. In other words, as Smuts puts it, “the reason we call all these
different  types  of  experiences  ‘pleasures’ is  not  because  of  some  similarity  in  the  way  the
experiences feel, since they feel very different, but because of some similarity in our responses”
(2011, 242). Several externalist, or attitudinal, views have been defended. Some have appealed to
conative attitudes, that is, attitudes of desire (Alston 1967; Carson 2000; Heathwood 2007), others
to sui generis attitudes such as liking (Parfit 2011) or the propositional attitude “taking pleasure in”
(Feldman 2004).
The other solution has been to resist the pressure from the heterogeneity problem, and maintain
that there is some kind of intrinsic “phenomenal quality” common to all pleasant experiences after
all. The standard typology of these felt-affect theories distinguishes between the distinctive feeling
account  (Moore 1993;  Bramble 2013) and the hedonic tone account  (Broad 2000;  Crisp 2006;
Smuts 2011).  Bramble characterizes the distinctive feeling account,  somewhat tautologically,  as
follows:  “for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant)  is  just  for it  to  involve or contain a
distinctive kind of feeling, one we might call ‘the feeling of pleasure itself’, or simply ‘the pleasant
feeling’” (2013, 202). The idea seems to be that pleasure is a phenomenal quality that is somehow
separated from the rest  of  the phenomenal  experience and in  particular,  in the case of sensory
pleasures,  from the sensation that  the subject  takes pleasure in.  This  is  the account  that  seems
particularly vulnerable to the heterogeneity problem (though Bramble (2013) has argued that it has
the resources to resist it). According to hedonic tone accounts, pleasure is a quality that somehow
infuses  our  phenomenal  experience.  There  are  different  ways  to  understand  this  claim.  One
interpretation draws on an analogy with loudness, which is arguably a dimension of all our auditory
experiences (Kagan 1992). In the same way, pleasure (and displeasure) would be a dimension of all
our  experiences.  Another  interpretation  draws  on  an  analogy  with  colors  (Crisp  2006):  the
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relationship between being colored and being red (or being blue) is  a determinate-determinable
relation; likewise, being pleasant would be a determinable property of many different determinate
properties instantiated by the experiences we intuitively consider as pleasant. 
Insofar as all these accounts investigate the essence of pleasure by taking as a starting point the
heterogeneity problem, they belong to what I shall call the heterogeneity approach. This approach
usually leads to an investigation of how pleasant experiences are structured: felt-affect accounts put
forward different ways in which a pleasant experience could somehow contain a phenomenological
entity corresponding to pleasure, whereas attitudinal accounts propose that pleasant experiences are
structured in a way that involves some attitude toward them. 
2 The Limits of the Heterogeneity Approach
The heterogeneity approach has accompanied a revival of the philosophical literature on pleasure,
and sparked a fruitful debate about its essence. In this section however, I would like to highlight the
limits of this approach, and argue that it  is unlikely to enable us to make more progress in the
future. In doing this, I shall call into question the relevance of the heterogeneity problem. I am not
the first to do so, since recurring worries have been expressed within the heterogeneity approach
itself. For example, Crisp describes the argument from heterogeneity as “spurious” (2006, 629), and
Smuts claims that “the heterogeneity problem is not a genuine problem” (2011, 242). My arguments
can be understood as an attempt to ground them in more general methodological worries.
Though there are a variety of considerations that have been brought up to support or undermine
specific accounts of pleasure within the heterogeneity approach, two kinds of considerations which
have  played  a  particularly  important  role:  armchair  introspective  evidence  and  theoretical
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assumptions about the mind, notably about how attention works and about the structure of our
pleasant experiences. I will review them successively and show that they are both problematic.
As already seen in the previous section, the heterogeneity problem invites us to use introspective
evidence  to  compare  the  phenomenal  character  of  different  pleasant  experiences,  in  order  to
subsequently attempt to isolate the phenomenology of pleasure. This raises the question of how
reliable our introspection is when it comes to introspecting our pleasant experiences. I would like to
argue  that  it  is  unreliable  when it  is  used for  the  purposes  of  discovering the  structure  of  our
pleasant experiences.
In recent  years  the  epistemological  ambition  of  introspection in  general  has  been subject  to
considerable scrutiny. Schwitzgebel (2008), in a much-discussed paper, argued that introspection is
unreliable most of the time, and there has been an ongoing debate around this question since then.
More to the point, Haybron (2007) argued that we are often mistaken about our affective states, so
that we are subject to what he calls  affective ignorance. Many authors within the heterogeneity
approach have also brought up similar worries about our introspective capacities in general (e.g.
Smuts 2011; Labukt 2012; Bramble 2013). For example, one difficulty identified by Smuts has to
do  with  remembering  our  past  pleasant  experiences.  According  to  him,  it  implies  that  “[i]t  is
unreasonable  to  expect  that  people  can  clearly  identify  a  common  phenomenal  aspect  among
experiences that they cannot recall with any level of specificity for much time at all.” (2011, 256) 
While these worries may give us prima facie reasons to be pessimistic about how far we can go
in investigating pleasure through armchair introspection, objections usually proceed by pointing out
the extent  of introspective disagreements,  that  is,  disagreements among philosophers over what
introspection tells us about the mind. Of course, one might argue that introspective disagreements
are to be resolved in the course of philosophical discussion. For example, Bayne and Spener (2010)
claimed that  some introspective disagreements  could be simply due to  terminological  variation
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among participants in the debate, or to the influence of background commitments and expectations.
Still,  the  more  widespread  introspective  disagreements  are  over  a  topic  of  research,  the  more
concerned we should be about our capacities to make genuine progress on this topic.
When it comes to the heterogeneity approach to pleasure, there are long-standing disagreements
about whether pleasant experiences seem heterogeneous in the first place. In other words, there are
disagreements  about  whether  there is  something phenomenal  in  common between our  pleasant
experiences.  As  noticed  by  Labukt,  “some  philosophers  claim  to  know  through  direct  self-
observation that their  pleasant experiences all  have the same hedonic tone and others that they
don’t” (Labukt 2012, 179). To give a few examples, Moen, talking about our intuition of the unity
of pleasures, writes:
Looking at  pleasures first,  it  seems that the taste of ice cream, the feeling of being
loved, and the excitement of reading a detective story—although these differ in many
respects—do share a certain quality (perhaps a certain kind of positive buzz), and it
seems to be by virtue of sharing this quality that they are pleasures and that we are able
to reliably pick them out as such. (Moen 2013, 528)
By contrast, Bain and Brady, for example, take the “non-phenomenality” of pleasure as a feature
that a satisfactory theory of pleasure would have to account for (Bain and Brady 2014, 5). Non-
phenomenality implies that pleasure is not a common phenomenal quality of pleasant experiences. 
I would like to suggest that this disagreement, as well as other disagreements between partisans
of different accounts of pleasure (e.g. between hedonic tone and distinctive feeling theorists), may
ultimately  trace  back  to  our  tenuous  introspective  access  to  the  structure  of  our  pleasant
experiences.  If  this  is  true,  introspective  disagreements  within  the  heterogeneity  approach  are
unlikely to be solved through armchair introspection. I certainly do not deny that we do have some
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sort of introspective access to the pleasant character of our experiences. Otherwise, how would we
come to know that our experience is pleasant or not, or that an experience is more pleasant than
another? However, when it comes to determining the  metaphysical status of pleasure within our
experience,  introspection  seems  to  flounder:  the  structure  of  our  pleasant  experiences  is  not
introspected in a way that can lend support to any specific account of pleasure. Perhaps this is just
an example of a more general failure of introspection, but I am open to the possibility that there
might be a special difficulty related to the introspection of affective states. 
To  illustrate  this,  suppose  that  felt-affect  theories  are  right,  so  that  pleasure  is  a
phenomenological entity. How exactly could introspection help us decide between the different felt-
affect  theories  in  competition?  It  seems to  me that  whether  pleasure  is  a  distinctive  feeling,  a
dimension or a determinable of our experience could not be settled on introspective grounds only.
This is suggested by my own attempts at introspecting my pleasant experiences, but it is also in line
with many remarks made within the heterogeneity approach.2 Part of the difficulty may lie in the
ignorance of what  introspecting our pleasant  experience would be like if,  say,  the determinate-
determinable account of pleasure were true: it is not clear whether we are able to recognize through
introspection a determinable property of our experience. More importantly, different accounts entail
different  modal claims about pleasant experiences. That pleasure is a distinctive feeling may be
understood as implying that it is possible for pleasure to occur independently from the rest of the
experience, which is ruled out if pleasure is a dimension of our experience. But introspection does
not give us access to modal facts about our experience! From what we introspect, there does not
seem to be any straightforward inference toward what our experience could be. If this is true, then
we  seem  to  be  confronted  with  a  fundamental  epistemological  problem  when  trying  to  put
2 For example, Carson notes that “[t]he feeling tone of pleasantness, if it exists at all, is a subtle and elusive quality of
our experience that is difficult to isolate” (2000, 14). Talking about whether there is heterogeneity in our pleasant
experiences,  Labukt  concedes  that  his  “own  attempts  to  answer  it  through  introspection  have  so  far  been
inconclusive” (Labukt 2012, 179).    
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introspective evidence to bear on candidate accounts of pleasure. 
Overall,  the precise articulation between pleasure and the rest of our phenomenal experience
appears to be largely hidden to the subject, so that further use of armchair introspective evidence is
unlikely to yield much more progress.
To make up for the limits of introspection, discussions within the heterogeneity approach have
relied  on  other  considerations  and  background  assumptions.  The  most  common  auxiliary
assumptions have to do with how attention and introspection work.3 Unfortunately, many of the
assumptions commonly appealed to are insufficiently motivated, so that the arguments that build on
them rest on shaky grounds, or so I will argue. Since an exhaustive review is beyond the scope of
this paper, I will focus on three such assumptions found in the heterogeneity approach, which stand
out either for their representativeness or the important role that they have played in the debate:
1. The heterogeneity problem is largely taken to imply that there is no phenomenal quality of
pleasure that we can introspectively isolate, that is, focus our attention on it alone. This in turn is
taken to discredit at least a crude distinctive feeling theory. The underlying assumption seems to be
that  if  pleasure  were  a  distinctive  feeling,  understood  as  an  independent  component  of  our
experiences, then we would be able to introspectively isolate it. Our alleged failure to do so would
then justify the move to hedonic tone theories, which are arguably less demanding in this respect
(though  one  could  claim  that  they  too  are  undermined  by  the  same  argument).  However,  the
assumption that we can introspectively isolate  all  the components of our experiences,  which is
required for this move, seems unwarranted. For example, it is common to hold that experiences of
flavors are composed of both taste and smell properties (Smith 2015), where taste properties include
3 In addition, one might think that general considerations about the structure of our experience may usefully constrain
our  accounts  of  pleasure.  For  example,  if  we  think  that  there  is  no  determinate-determinable  relation  in  our
phenomenology (perhaps because we think that there is no determinate-determinable relation  tout court) Crisp’s
account seems to be straightforwardly undermined. This might be the spirit of Bramble’s objection against Crisp’s
proposal (2013, 207–8). The problem is that the structure of our experiences in general is itself a very controversial
issue, so it is a problematic ground to build an argument on.
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sweetness or bitterness. The flavor of a strawberry, for example,  would not be an unanalyzable
phenomenal quality. Nevertheless, we cannot introspectively isolate the smell components from the
taste components of the flavor of a strawberry. As Smith puts it, “[o]nce taste and smell fuse into an
experience  of  flavour,  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  separate  out  the  different  components  by
phenomenological decomposition.” (Smith 2015, 323) This is supported by the fact that people who
gradually lose olfaction, a condition known as anosmia, tend to report first their incapacity to taste
flavors.  Likewise,  though  the  phenomenal  quality  associated  with  hearing  a  chord  is  certainly
composed  of  different,  independent  notes  that  a  trained musician  can  easily  distinguish,  many
inexperienced people are unable to do so. While these putative counterexamples do not definitely
rebut the assumption that we can introspectively isolate the components of our experience, they do
shed doubt on the most central argument in the heterogeneity approach.
2. In arguing against the distinctive feeling theory, Smuts (2011, 255) apparently endorses an
argument made by Alston which is based on an implausible assumption about how attention works.
Alston (1967) argued that if pleasure were a distinctive component of our experiences, it would be a
distraction, that is, something we would tend to focus our attention on.4 But, the argument goes,
pleasure is not a distraction: if  I am playing video games in a pleasant state of flow, I am not
tempted to stop playing to attend to the pleasant character of my experience. Of course, I know that
the pleasant character of the experience would stop should I stop playing. But, more fundamentally,
the  pleasant  character  of  my experience  does  not  capture  my attention.  Although  he  does  not
develop the argument in much detail, its success clearly depends on the assumption that there is a
direct  relationship  between  the  “size”  of  a  phenomenal  component  and how much attention  it
draws: the larger the component of our experience,  the more our attention would be repeatedly
drawn to it. This is a substantial assumption about how attention works, and it is far from obvious.
4 This may be inspired by a well-known argument developed by Ryle to defend his dispositionalist view of pleasure
(Ryle 2009).
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One might think that a phenomenal component which continuously grows in our consciousness
could go unnoticed, since no sudden change would attract the subject’s attention (especially if, as it
is the case in the state of flow, her attention is already focused on the activity that she is immersed
in).  Perhaps one could  take it  to  be true in  virtue of  what  attention  does:  what  is  attended to
becomes  a  bigger  component  of  one’s  experience.  But  again  this  would  be  a  controversial
assumption about the relationship between attention and consciousness, which is the object of a
large literature in philosophy of mind (see Watzl 2011 Section 3; Mole 2017 Section 3.1 for brief
introductions about this topic). In any case, it is not an assumption that has enough support to draw
a conclusive argument against any theory of pleasure.
3. Finally, let us focus on Bramble’s “reflective blindness” objection against attitudinal views
(2013, 2016, 2019). It is based on two conflicting premises. First, he argues that we are sometimes
unaware  of  our  sensory  pleasures  while  they  occur.  He  draws  on  alleged  examples  from
Schwitzgebel and Haybron’s works. Haybron’s examples include those affective states that “exceed
our powers of discernment even while they are occurring” (Haybron 2008, 222). For example,
Perhaps you have lived with a refrigerator that often whined due to a bad bearing. If so,
you might have found that,  with time, you entirely ceased to notice the racket.  But
occasionally, when the compressor stopped, you did notice the sudden, glorious silence.
You might also have noted, first, a painful headache, and second, that you’d had no idea
how obnoxious the noise was – or that it was occurring at all – until it  ceased. But
obnoxious it  was,  and all  the  while  it  had been,  unbeknownst  to  you,  fouling  your
experience as you went about your business. In short, you’d been having an unpleasant
experience without knowing it. (2008, 205)
Second,  Bramble  advances  that  “one  can  hardly  have  the  relevant  kind  of  attitude  (be  it
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disliking, not wanting, disvaluing, or whatever) toward an experience that one is entirely unaware
of” (his italics, 2013, 204). In his initial paper, this claim is taken to be intuitive enough on its own.
The problem for attitudinal theories, then, is that they cannot account for pleasures that we are
unaware  of,  and  Bramble  takes  this  to  be  “a  decisive  objection”  against  them  (p.  203).  This
objection  has  been  criticized  in  recent  articles  by  Heathwood  (2018)  and  Feldman  (2018).
Heathwood makes a distinction between weak and strong awareness, and argues that the fact that
we are weakly aware of the experiences in question in Bramble’s argument is sufficient for our
having the  relevant  attitude  toward them.  Feldman,  on the  other  hand,  denies  the  existence  of
pleasures of which we are unaware: of the experiences mentioned by Bramble, he pursues, either
we are aware of them or they are not (un)pleasant. 
A detailed examination of the argument would be beyond the scope of this paper, but I would
like  to  briefly  suggest  that  both  premises  are  either  underspecified  or  lack  adequate  support,
especially in the light of the relevant literature in philosophy of mind.
The first premise in Bramble’s argument, that there are pleasures of which we are not aware, suffers
from considerable ambiguity (not much alleviated by Heathwood’s subsequent distinction between
weak  and  strong  awareness).  Though  Bramble  seems  to  take  awareness  as  a  non-problematic
notion, it  has been subject to much debate in philosophy of mind. By asking about the kind of
awareness we can have toward some of our peripheral experiences, it is thus clear that Bramble
touches  on  difficult  issues  involving  the  relationship  between  attention,  awareness,  and
consciousness, that are in no way specific to pleasure. Bramble’s idea seems to be that the pleasant
experiences of which we are unaware still belong to our phenomenal experience.5 The problem is
that there is clearly a sense in which we are always aware of our phenomenal experience.6 To avoid
5 Talk of pleasant  experiences is best  understood as implying the existence of a phenomenology, since the term
“experience”  is  usually  taken  to  refer  to  phenomenal experience.  In  addition,  he  draws  on  an  example  by
Schwitzgebel which explicitly mentions a phenomenological state.
6 Block (2007), for example, talks of “Awareness” to refer to this sense of awareness associated with phenomenal
experience.
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contradiction, Bramble has to maintain that there is another sense in which we remain unaware of
these pleasures. In philosophy of mind, following the well-known (but controversial) distinction by
Block (1995), phenomenal consciousness is often contrasted with access consciousness, which has
to  do  with availability of  the  conscious  state  for  use  by different  cognitive  functions,  such as
memory, reasoning and decision-making. On this interpretation of awareness, a subject is aware of
something only if she can use it  for various cognitive purposes. The existence of mental states
which  are  phenomenally  conscious  but  not  access  conscious  is  controversial,  as  well  as  their
relationship  with  attention.7 In  addition,  a  more  cognitively  sophisticated  kind  of  awareness  is
sometimes hinted at: in Haybron’s previous example above, it is emphasized that the subject did not
know that she was having an unpleasant experience, and “Unknown Pleasures” is also the title of
Bramble’s 2019 paper in which he responds to Heathwood and Feldman’s objections. Now, talk of
“knowing”  seems  to  imply  a  more  sophisticated  cognitive  awareness  than  either  phenomenal
consciousness  or  access  consciousness.  Knowing  something  arguably  requires  holding  a
propositional attitude. As a result, there is nothing contradictory about having a pleasant experience
(with phenomenal awareness) available for further cognitive processes (with access awareness) but
nonetheless  “unknown”  by  the  subject.  In  any  case,  without  more  precision  on  the  kind  of
awareness  that  Bramble is  concerned with,  it  is  difficult  to  properly assess the cogency of  the
premise.
While  the  second  assumption  –  that  one  cannot  have  a  liking  or  desire  attitude  toward  an
experience which we are unaware of – has apparently been accepted by all  participants  in  the
debate, it strikes me as unmotivated, whatever the sense of unawareness at play. Perhaps Bramble
has in mind a picture of attitudes as voluntary, effortful mental acts, in which case it is natural to
7 Block mentions  a case similar to Haybron’s refrigerator example, which he interprets as involving phenomenal
consciousness  without  access  consciousness  (Block  1995,  234).  See  Schlicht  (2012) for  a  review of  different
alternative interpretations of this case.
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suppose that  the  subject  must  have  a  prior  awareness  of  something before  holding an  attitude
toward it. But I do not see any reason to accept such a restrictive view on attitudes.8 In a subsequent
article (Bramble 2016), he argues that denying the assumption has undesirable consequences: since
we have a lot of subtle, peripheral pleasures and pains at all times, accepting that we have some
attitude toward each of them would lead to an implausible inflation in the number of attitudes that a
subject has at a given time. But why is such a “rich” view about attitudes implausible? The only
(brief) justification given by Bramble (in his 2019 article, ft 16) is that this objection runs parallel to
a  similar  objection  made against  higher-order  theories  of  consciousness.  Indeed,  these  theories
claim that conscious states are just those states which are the object of a (higher-order) attitude from
the  subject.  They thus  require  the  existence  of  a  very  large  number  of  (higher-order)  attitudes
toward (first-order) mental states to account for the variety of our conscious states. It has been
objected that it is implausible to suppose that the subject can have so many higher-order attitudes.
But  the  success  of  this  objection  against  higher-order  theories  of  consciousness  is  itself
controversial, and Bramble says little to support it. As a result, endorsing it and building on it to
develop a different  objection,  this  time against  some specific  accounts of  pleasure,  amounts  to
cherry-picking. 
What stands out from the debates over the three assumptions reviewed is how isolated they have
been from other relevant domains of research.  Since they take a stand on complex, unresolved
issues related to introspection, attention or the structure of our experiences, they do not properly
belong to the philosophy of pleasure. However, there seems to be no consistent attempt to engage
with the existing debate on these questions. While it is difficult to draw a general conclusion from
8 One might try to defend the assumption by claiming that it is the attitude itself that makes the subject aware of its
object. This would be a standard claim for representationalists (such as Tye 1995), who argue that conscious states
are  states  that  represent  something else,  but  this  is  clearly not  the framework that  Bramble  operates  with.  In
addition, Bramble’s assumption might introduce an asymmetry with pro-attitudes whose object is not experiential.
If I desire that my friend come to visit me tomorrow, I arguably do not have a prior awareness of the proposition
that my friend comes to visit me tomorrow before I have the attitude of desire toward it.  This means that the
assumption must hold only for pro-attitudes with experiential objects.
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an  examination  limited  to  a  few assumptions,  I  tentatively  conclude  that  some key theoretical
considerations in the heterogeneity approach rest on shaky foundations.
This has damaging consequences. The use of ad hoc auxiliary assumptions about introspection,
attention,  and  the  structure  of  our  experiences  makes  it  easy  to  defend  different  accounts  of
pleasure. Consider the following defense of the distinctive feeling account by Bramble:
if the distinctive feeling theory is true, we should not expect to be able to gain a clear
sense of ‘the pleasant feeling’, or the way in which all pleasant experiences feel alike.
The reason is that, if the distinctive feeling theory is true, most instances of ‘the pleasant
feeling’ are,  taken  by  themselves,  virtually  imperceptible.  They  occur  in  extremely
small quantities (or low intensities), and in very abstract or ethereal locations in one’s
experiential field, locations that are not at all easy to direct one’s attention toward, or
focus  upon.  What  does  a  pleasant  experience  of  sunbathing  have  in  common
phenomenologically with one of drinking a cool beer on a hot day? Just that it has a
whole  lot  of  these  tiny,  independently  virtually  imperceptible,  feelings  scattered
throughout it. (Bramble 2013, 210)
He makes clear that introspection cannot help us to confirm or infirm his account: our failure to
identify these “tiny, independently virtually imperceptible, feelings” can be explained by the limits
of  our  introspective  capacities.  In  doing  this,  he  has  to  make  controversial  metaphysical
assumptions: are there really “ethereal locations” in our conscious experience “that are not at all
easy  to  direct  one’s  attention  toward”?  Why  would  the  small  quantities  of  pleasure  scattered
throughout  our  experiential  field aggregate  in  a  way that  nonetheless  cannot  be introspectively
isolated? These considerations play a crucial role in his defense of the distinctive feeling account,
and yet lack independent support. As a result, they seem arbitrary. 
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I conclude that the heterogeneity approach relies heavily on debatable armchair introspective
evidence and problematic theoretical assumptions. This suggests that the heterogeneity approach
might  have  an  overly  limited  evidential  basis,  insufficient  to  successfully  decide  between  the
different accounts in competition. As a result, it is unlikely to make further progress. 
3 Toward a Natural-Kind Approach
Up to now, my results are rather negative. I have attempted to show that the heterogeneity approach
to pleasure may have come to a standstill. I turn now to the positive argument of this paper. I would
like to introduce a new direction for research, one that moves the focus away from introspective
considerations about the phenomenological similarity of our pleasant experiences and allows for a
better connection between the philosophy of pleasure and the rest of philosophy of mind: a natural-
kind approach.9 To be clear, this new approach does not enable us to decide between the different
accounts highlighted by the heterogeneity approach. Rather, it asks new questions about pleasure,
ones on which we may be able to make more progress. Importantly, these questions still have to do
with the nature of pleasure. 
What Is a Natural-Kind Approach?
9 I am not the first to put forward a natural-kind approach to pleasure: Katz (2016) explicitly evokes in passing the
idea that pleasure may or not be a natural  kind. More recently,  valence has been treated as a natural  kind by
Carruthers (2018). At the beginning of his paper he characterizes valence as “pleasure and displeasure”. Because he
is primarily interested in a technical concept used by psychologists, and not in the common-sense notion of pleasure
or  the  one  relevant  to  ethical  theorizing,  he  takes  a  slightly  different  perspective  on  whether  pleasure  (and
displeasure) is a natural kind.
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Natural kinds are categories which carve nature at its joints. They are determined by the way the
world is structured, rather than by the interests of the subject doing the categorization. In other
words,  there  is  something  objective  about  natural  kinds,  which  explains  why  discovering  and
studying natural kinds is often considered as an important task for scientific inquiry. In particular,
natural kinds are taken to support inductive generalizations across their members: that one member
has property P can be taken as evidence that most of the other members have P too. Paradigmatic
examples of successful natural kinds include chemical elements such as gold or helium: different
individuals of the same chemical element have in common a specific microphysical organization,
that distinguishes them from individuals of any other chemical element.  In this sense,  different
instances of gold or helium share the same essence. Other kinds, like biological species, have a
more disputed status (Bird and Tobin 2018). For biological species and many other kinds found in
special sciences (biology, social sciences, etc.), it is generally recognized that talk of essence, which
points to a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for something to belong to the kind, has to be
abandoned, but this does not necessarily threaten their status as natural kinds (more on this below). 
In the case of pleasure, asking whether it is a natural kind thus amounts to asking whether there
is something objective about the way we categorize all occurrences of pleasure under the same
category, and asking what the putative natural kind of pleasure would consist in amounts to asking
in virtue of what pleasure would be a natural kind. As I said earlier, the heterogeneity approach was
rooted in questions about the similarity between pleasant experiences. The natural-kind approach
could be understood as a new, more comprehensive attempt to investigate this similarity. As will
become  clearer  later,  this  may  redirect  philosophers’  attention  toward  currently  relatively
overlooked topics of inquiry.
A natural-kind approach to pleasure would enable a convergence with many debates over other
mental entities in philosophy of mind. Indeed, it is common in many areas of philosophy of mind to
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ask about the natural-kind status of mental entities belonging to folk psychology, such as desire (e.g.
Schroeder 2004), memory (e.g. Michaelian 2011), concepts (e.g. Machery 2005), emotion and its
discrete categories like anger or sadness (for influential discussions, see Griffiths, 1997; Barrett,
2006), or mental entities postulated by scientific research, such as clinical depression and other
nosological categories (see Kincaid and Sullivan 2014). In contrast, as is shown by the examples
developed in the last  section,  it  is  striking that  the investigation of  pleasure has  comparatively
remained  this  isolated  from  philosophy  of  mind,  psychology  and  neuroscience  (important
exceptions aside, such as Aydede 2000, 2014, 2018; Crisp and Kringelbach 2018; Katz 2016).10 This
can be explained by the fact that recent works on pleasure within the heterogeneity approach stem
from ethics (as noted by Aydede 2014, 12). The discrepancy in treatment between the concept of
pleasure and other folk-psychology mental concepts is all the more unfortunate since the concept of
pleasure  seems  comparatively  to  be  more  amenable  to  a  natural-kind  approach.  Indeed,  some
mental concepts are used in so many different contexts, and in seemingly so many different senses,
that they are suspicious candidates for being natural kinds.11 In contrast, the concept of pleasure
seems to be well-delimited, and thus more likely to pick out a natural kind, as evidenced by the
relative consensus over which experiences count as pleasant (also noted by Carson 2000, 13).
The natural-kind approach is most distinctive in the methodological tools that it brings to the
investigation of pleasure. Indeed, in accordance with its naturalistic perspective, the natural-kind
approach makes use of a wide variety of empirical methods and results. In the case of pleasure,
rather than primarily appealing to armchair introspective evidence and theoretical considerations,
philosophers could additionally draw on empirical research from psychology and neuroscience. To
get a grasp of the variety of these methods and results, let us give a few examples of the potentially
10 Note that the heterogeneity approach has also been disconnected from the literature concerned with displeasure,
arguably the opposite of pleasure. For example, there is a thriving literature on pain in philosophy of mind (see
Corns 2018 for a recent review). 
11 For example, Schueler (2011) denies that the concept of desire is suited for a natural-kind approach, while Haybron
(2008 Chapter 2) notes the special difficulty in asking what happiness is, due to the diversity of its meanings.
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relevant research.
Insofar as pleasure, together with other affective states, plays a crucial role in motivating and
directing the individual’s behavior, it can be investigated in terms of how it affects the individual’s
chances of reproduction and survival. For example, pleasure is directly involved in homeostatic
processes, i.e. those processes that enable the organism to retain some key biological parameters
within  desirable  bounds.  Evolutionary  considerations,  by  pointing  to  the  adaptive  function  of
pleasure,  might  illuminate  the  role  of  pleasure  in  our  mental  life  (for  example  LeDoux 2012;
Dickinson and Balleine 2009). In psychology, the behavior of individuals has long been interpreted
as directed toward obtaining reward stimuli, such as food or sex, which are usually understood as
pleasure-giving rewards. With the rise of neuroscience, it has become possible to investigate the
neurobiology underlying this  reward system. It  has been done in the growing field of affective
neuroscience,  which  has  discovered  several  brain  areas  involved  in  the  production  of  pleasant
experiences, as well as different components in the reward system, which may give rise to different
felt  qualities  in  our  phenomenal  experience  (for  a  summary  of  the  main  results  of  affective
neuroscience  on  pleasure,  see  Berridge  and  Kringelbach  (2015)).  Together  with  results  from
neuroeconomics, which is concerned with investigating the brain processes underlying decision-
making, notably so-called value-based decision-making, the neural substrates of pleasure can be
investigated in a way that is likely to illuminate its nature (see for example Glimcher and Fehr
2014).
As already mentioned, many philosophers of pleasure currently make heavy use of armchair
introspection, which is prone to various biases. However, there have been attempts to use more
rigorous introspective reports to inform our theories of affective states (see Miskovic, Kuntzelman,
and Fletcher 2015 for a discussion of how affective neuroscience currently deals with subjective
experience of affect.). For example, Colombetti (2013) has defended the use of first- and second-
21
person methods to investigate the bodily character of our affective experiences.
By  enriching  the  range  of  considerations  drawn  upon  in  the  philosophical  investigation  of
pleasure, the natural-kind approach would appear to have the potential to solve the methodological
impasse. 
Some Objections Against the Natural-Kind Approach
Before I go on to explore some implications of the natural-kind approach, I would like to respond to
a few potential objections.
The variety of considerations just outlined gives rise to the problem of how we should weigh
them against each other.  Should some of them prevail  over others? Natural-kind approaches in
general  are  sometimes  criticized  as  surrendering  the  philosophical  investigation  to  scientists.12
Indeed, since most of the distinctive methodological tools brought by the natural-kind approach
come from scientific research, it could be argued that this approach amounts de facto to giving up
the philosophical investigation of pleasure to scientists, so that the concept of pleasure would end
up referring to whatever scientists are referring to with this concept. As a result, one could worry
that a natural-kind approach puts too much – illegitimate – responsibility in scientists'  hands. I
would like to briefly argue that this is not the case. While some concepts like that of water have
been taken over, so to say, by scientists, the concept of pleasure is unlikely to undergo the same fate.
The subtleties of the common-sense notion of pleasure and its importance for ethics justify that
philosophers take a significant part in its investigation. In addition, there are notoriously difficult
philosophical issues when it comes to mental concepts belonging to folk psychology in general,
12 See Griffiths (2013) for an interesting review of the opposition between naturalistic and non-naturalistic approaches
to affective states. 
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notably due to their use in ordinary explanations and predictions and our alleged first-person access
to what they refer to.13 Overall,  this  suggests that the epistemic authority of scientists  on these
questions may be greatly limited.
This general response might not satisfy the critics, who could still argue that it is unclear why
scientists (or scientifically informed considerations) should have any say in defining pleasure, since
their purposes are so different from philosophers’. Although it is true that, in the end, both scientists
and philosophers want to elucidate what pleasure is, one could object that the move towards the
natural-kind  approach  would  give  up  on  important  aspects  of  the  original  purpose  of  the
philosophical investigation of pleasure. Let us review two versions of this objection.
Since many philosophers investigating the nature of pleasure, especially within the heterogeneity
approach, think that pleasure is a phenomenological entity, primarily accessible from a first-person
point of view, it could be argued that the natural-kind approach would not do justice to this idea.
Insofar as the natural-kind approach is naturalistic at its core, and that phenomenological entities are
notoriously  difficult  to  accommodate  within  naturalistic  frameworks,  it  would  ensue  that  the
natural-kind approach is not suited for the task of finding out what pleasure is. 
While I do think that there are additional difficulties raised by the putative phenomenological
aspect of pleasure, I do not think that it is enough to undermine the prospects of the natural-kind
approach. First, it should be emphasized that its phenomenological aspect is itself fairly contested,
as  I  have  already  shown.  It  would  be  unreasonable  to  take  it  for  granted.  Second,  its
phenomenological aspect may not be an unanalyzable feature. Perhaps it can be accounted for by
other aspects of pleasure: the phenomenology of pleasure could be e.g. desire-like. Third, other
mental states that arguably have a phenomenological aspect, such as perceptual states or pain, have
been subject to scientifically informed philosophical accounts as well. Fourth, whether the putative
13 See Murphy (2017) for a review of different positions about the integration of folk psychology with empirical
psychology and neuroscience.
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phenomenological aspect of pleasure is adequately taken into account depends mainly on how the
considerations outlined above are combined. In other words, it is up to philosophers to give pride of
place to a priori considerations in their natural-kind investigation of pleasure. Fifth, the gap between
non-scientific and scientific considerations is not to be exaggerated. For example, is there really a
gap between armchair introspection-based considerations raised by philosophers and more rigorous
introspection-based methods developed by scientists?
A second variant of this objection is that the natural-kind approach loses sight of the normative
significance of pleasure, which is what gave the initial impetus to the heterogeneity approach. It is
true  that  the  literature  on  pleasure  has  long  been  primarily  about  ethics  –  Crisp  (2006)  still
introduces his own theory of pleasure for the sake of supporting a hedonistic theory of well-being –,
but it has since then become largely autonomous, so there is no reason to keep the discussion within
the bounds of ethics. But there is perhaps a more specific objection stemming from this general
worry. Many philosophers (including Crisp 2006; Labukt 2012; Smuts 2011) define pleasure in a
way  that  makes  crucial  use  of  the  normative  aspect  of  pleasure.  One  problem  could  be  that
naturalistic approaches cannot make sense of this essential normative aspect of pleasure. According
to Labukt,
It is also doubtful whether the normative hedonic tone view [i.e. his theory of pleasure]
is compatible with a naturalistic account of goodness. A naturalist cannot claim that
positive  hedonic  tones  are  united  by  possessing  some very  special  non-natural  and
irreducibly normative property.  He would have to maintain that the goodness of the
positive hedonic states is a purely natural phenomenon. […] It seems, then, that the
property that, according to the normative hedonic tone view, unites pleasant and painful
experiences must in some sense be irreducibly normative. It is not identical with any
purely natural or factual properties of hedonic states (2012, 191)
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In moving to the natural-kind approach, there seems to be no longer any room for this kind of
views.  I  agree  that  Labukt's  view is  not  compatible  with  a  natural-kind  approach  to  pleasure.
However, his idea that the normative essence of pleasure is wholly non-natural and irreducible to
any natural property is rather uncommon. A detailed examination of Labukt's interesting proposal
would  take  me  too  far,  but  most  philosophers  would  accept,  contra Labukt,  that  the  putative
normative essence of pleasure would still at least have to supervene on natural properties. As soon
as we accept this fairly weak commitment, we can confidently proceed to a natural-kind approach to
pleasure. In sum, I think that the range of views that are ruled out by the natural-kind approach is
limited to implausible views. In contrast, the idea that pleasure has (perhaps essentially) normative
properties is not ruled out.14
Some Directions for Research in the Natural-Kind Approach to Pleasure
Now that the guiding principles of the natural-kind approach have been clarified, I would like to say
more about promising directions for research within a natural-kind approach.
First,  it  is  important  to  note  that,  strictly  speaking,  many  accounts  developed  within  the
heterogeneity approach may still be included within the natural-kind approach. For example, felt-
affect accounts, according to which pleasure just is a phenomenal quality, could be understood as a
broadly essentialist answer to the natural-kind question: all and only occurrences of pleasure would
share this  phenomenal quality.  But,  in addition,  the natural-kind approach extends the range of
accounts  of  pleasure  in  interesting  ways.  Indeed,  natural-kind  research  usually  starts  with  the
observation of a diversity of co-occurring properties that the alleged members of the kind tend to
14 The notion of normative kind has been proposed for kinds which are partially defined in terms of their normative
role (P. E. Griffiths 2004). I leave open the possibility that pleasure be some sort of normative kind.
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share. One of the important tasks of the natural-kind approach is then to explain this cluster of co-
occurring properties. For example, water (in its liquid state) is associated with manifest properties
such as being transparent, being drinkable, etc. The discovery of the essence of water – H2O –
made it possible to explain these various manifest properties.
Likewise, occurrences of pleasure are associated with a variety of manifest properties, though
this is sometimes obfuscated in the philosophical literature. Let us review the most salient ones. The
relevance of each of these manifest properties may of course be questioned, but I take them to be
commonsensical intuitions that we have about pleasure. To start with, pleasure is instantiated in
conscious occurrences, which justifies our talking about pleasant experiences in the first place. This
implies that the subject can become aware of the pleasant experience at the moment in which it
occurs.15 Not only is pleasure taken to be conscious, but also phenomenally conscious. This suggests
that  pleasure  is  associated  with  phenomenological  properties,  i.e.  what  pleasant  experiences
putatively feel like. Conative (or motivational) properties are those properties that pleasure has in
virtue of its relationship with desires and motivation: we tend to have various sorts of desires that
involve pleasant experiences, including the desires that the pleasant experience occur and persist,
but also desires whose satisfaction produces pleasant experiences, like the desire to get a promotion
or to relieve one's thirst. Cognitive properties of pleasure include the property of being positively
appraised  by  the  subject,  and  subsequently  becoming  the  object  of  a  representation  that  will
contribute  to  the  orientation  of  future  behavior.  Finally,  normative  properties  have  to  do  with
pleasant experiences being arguably intrinsically good, providing normative reasons to act in certain
ways, etc.
A satisfactory  account  of  pleasure  aims  at  explaining  these  co-occurring  properties.  Most
existing accounts of pleasure in the philosophical literature define pleasure in terms of only one of
15 On one interpretation, this intuition directly contradicts Bramble’s claim that there are pleasures of which we are
not aware. This is fine: after all, Bramble’s claim is indeed counterintuitive.
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these properties, which is taken to be the essence of pleasure: they can be thought of as  single-
feature accounts of pleasure. Roughly, felt-quality accounts take the phenomenological aspect of
pleasure to be essential, while desire-based accounts take the motivational aspect to be essential.
They then go on to attempt to explain the other manifest properties associated with occurrences of
pleasure in terms of this single feature identified as essential. But this is a difficult task, which is
why objections against accounts of pleasure often proceed by pointing out that they fail to explain
some manifest property associated with occurrences of pleasure. For example, Bramble mentions
Findlay's objection against felt-quality accounts, which questions the capacity of these accounts to
explain why we want pleasure (Bramble 2013, 212). Symmetrically, desire-based accounts are often
criticized on the basis that they fail to account for the phenomenological aspect (Aydede 2014, 124).
By contrast, the natural-kind approach brings with it new ways of dealing with this variety of
manifest properties. On one of the main theories of natural kinds, the Homeostatic Property Cluster
view  (Boyd  1991),  the  co-occurring  manifest  properties  are  to  be  explained  by  appeal  to  an
underlying causal mechanism, which may then be what grounds the natural kind.16 In the case of
mental entities, the underlying causal mechanism is often characterized as a neurophysiological or
neurofunctional entity, whose role in the brain would explain the manifest properties of pleasure.17
In the case of pleasure, although it is surely too soon to draw any definitive conclusion, affective
neuroscience has investigated the neurobiological substrates of pleasant experiences and identified
several processes in a distributed network of brain areas which are involved in the production of
pleasant experiences. There is evidence suggesting that the same brain areas are responsible for a
large variety of pleasant experiences (Berridge and Kringelbach 2015). This has been interpreted as
supporting the existence of a “neural common currency”, which in turn would favor the view that
16 It should be noted that, in the philosophical literature, Edwards (1979) has brought up the idea that occurrences of
pleasure share a family resemblance. The Homeostatic Property Cluster view can be thought of as extending this
idea by postulating the existence of an underlying mechanism that explains this family resemblance.
17 This is for example how Schroeder (2004) proceeds for desire.
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all occurrences of pleasure fall under the same category, and thus that pleasure is a natural kind. 
There  are  significant  issues  that  will  need  to  be  solved  in  the  course  of  the  natural-kind
investigation, and which would provide promising directions for research for philosophers. Let us
focus on two examples.18
First,  how  exactly  do  motivational  aspects  contribute  to  pleasure?  As  already  mentioned,
research has shown that the reward system may be decomposed into various processes, which often
occur simultaneously during an ordinary occurrence of pleasure: “liking”, “wanting” and learning
processes (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2015, the quotation marks distinguish the liking and wanting in
question  from  their  ordinary  counterparts).  The  “wanting”  component  is  interpreted  as  what
underlies craving. It adds “a visceral omph to mental desires” (Berridge 2009, 378–9). By contrast,
the “liking” component is often considered to be what gives rise to the pleasant experience itself
(what is sometimes called the “hedonic impact” of the reward). Interestingly, the two components
can be decoupled under certain circumstances: for example, in cases of addiction the “wanting”
attitude can occur without “liking”.  Now, the distinction between the two may have interesting
consequences concerning the role of the motivational aspect of pleasure.19 It seems to show that
pleasure and desire are not as tightly connected as one could intuitively think, casting doubt on one
of the commonsensical features associated with pleasure. Of course, it also bears directly on the
plausibility of desire-based theories of pleasure. What if it  turns out that the “wanting” attitude
underlies most of our intuitions in favor of these theories? If we think that occurrences of pleasure
should be identified with occurrences of the “liking” attitude only, it would ensue that most of the
intuitive support for desire-based theories collapses.
Second, are unconscious pleasures possible? We have seen that the idea of pleasures of which we
18 Other  issues  that  could  benefit  from  a  natural-kind  approach  includes  the  relationship  between  pleasure  and
displeasure.  One  might  argue  against  the  natural-kind  status  of  pleasure  on  the  basis  that  it  is  pleasure  and
displeasure together that properly constitute a natural kind (as Carruthers 2018 seems to proceed). 
19 Berridge (2009) discusses a series of other philosophical implications drawn from these results.
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are not aware has been at the center of Bramble’s objection against attitudinal theories, but these
pleasures  were  still  thought  to  belong  to  our  phenomenal  experience.  However,  the  issue  of
unconscious pleasures also extends to putative cases of pleasures which are not even phenomenally
experienced.  Neuroscientists  sometimes  argue  for  the  existence  of  the  latter  by  appealing  to
evidence to the effect that the brain processes which underlie ordinary occurrences of pleasure may
also be activated in the absence of conscious experience (for a review of neuroscientists’ views on
the topic, see Kringelbach and Berridge 2009, 7–8). Berridge concludes that “independent evidence
for unconscious ‘liking’ reactions, even if rare, must force us to expand our definition of pleasure.”
(Kringelbach and Berridge 2009, 7) Indeed, it has been shown that there are cases of subliminal
affective priming, where subjects are subliminally presented with happy or angry emotional facial
expressions, which produce a hedonic reaction that has an influence on the subject’s subsequent
behavior  and  preferences  without  a  corresponding  conscious  experience  (K.  Berridge  and
Winkielman 2003).  Now, we might be reluctant to accept the existence of such pleasures. This is
because  pleasure  is  intuitively  thought  to  be  a  phenomenally  conscious  mental  state.  So,  is
unconscious  pleasure  a  contradiction  or  not?  Answering  this  question  requires  to  decide  how
revisionary we want to be with respect to our commonsensical understanding of pleasure, but also
to explore further the ethical significance of pleasure. For example, one might accept the existence
of such pleasures if we think that phenomenally unconscious pleasures can be good for the subject
having them.
Finally, what if it turns out that pleasure is not a natural kind? This could be a reason to adopt an
eliminativist position, according to which talk of pleasure should be entirely abandoned. It would
also be of extreme significance to ethical theorizing, insofar as it may shed doubt on the many
ethical theories, notably (normative) hedonism and classical utilitarianism, which assign a central
role  to pleasure.  The philosophical  discussion could then usefully focus on identifying putative
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adjacent  natural  kinds,  that  is,  natural  kinds that  overlap with the extension of our ordinary or
normatively relevant concept of pleasure, and which might possibly explain our false impression
that  pleasure  itself  is  a  natural  kind.  The  purpose  of  philosophical  work  could  then  become
thoroughly revisionary.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have advocated a new approach to pleasure, one that better acknowledges the fact
that pleasure is a multifaceted mental state, and that its diverse facets can all be contested. In doing
this, it builds on the rejection by the heterogeneity approach of the naive picture of pleasure as a
non-problematic phenomenal quality. 
In recent years, there has been an impressive surge in the number of works purporting to study
the natural-kind status of a wide variety of entities. Since the notion of natural kind has been subject
to important evolutions and amendments20, and associated with a wide array of epistemological and
metaphysical positions, this move may be considered as mere posturing. I hope to have provided
enough reasons to think that, in the case of pleasure, a natural-kind approach is more than a sleight
of  hand:  it  constitutes  a  promising  way  forward  for  the  philosophy  of  pleasure.  Importantly,
although I have made a plea for more attention to be paid to empirical research in the philosophy of
pleasure, I have attempted to show that it does not imply surrendering the investigation of pleasure
to psychologists  and neuroscientists.  Rather,  the diversification of considerations that  it  enables
opens up new avenues for future research, which remain to be explored by philosophers. 
 
20 See Hacking (2007) for a critical review of the different uses of the notion of natural kind.
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